This research is part of a larger e ort to build machine-based tools for developing scienti c theories. In analogy with the research process in empirical research, we describe a logical cycle of theory development: (1) starting with an informal version of a theory, (2) then moving to its formal representation, (3) applying formal logic to investigate this representation, and (4) using the results as feedback for the update/revision of the original theory. A central aspect of the logical cycle is the detection of the (hidden) implications of a theory (called \partial deductive closure"). In this paper, we present an algorithm that performs the partial deductive closure for a relevant class of theorems, while ltering out trivial results. The algorithm is applied to an important organization theory, Organizational Ecology, and is shown to generate new theorems of interest.
Introduction
Computer simulation has become a standard tool in Management Science. A domain is represented in a formal language, and the properties of the domain are investigated through the properties of the formal representation (the \simulation model").
Traditionally, such representations used equational mathematics, e.g., numerical di erence equations, as the formal language (Forrester, 1961; Cohen et al., 1972; Burton and Obel, 1984) . Recent years, however, have seen various e orts to use \qualitative" or \declar-ative" representation languages instead (Baligh et al., 1990; Glorie et al., 1990; Blanning, 1992; Carley and Prietula, 1994; P eli et al., 1994; Kamps and P eli, 1995) . These e orts are usually inspired by progress in Arti cial Intelligence|and by domains so complex that they defy numerical representation. The researcher may not know the numerical value of a variable, but still want to incorporate this variable in the model. For this reason, qualitative languages are an attractive alternative for numerical languages.
With the advent of expert systems, a large variety of qualitative languages became available. The common denominator of these languages is usually (a fragment of) First Order Logic (FOL), the best known formal logic. This commonality has focussed attention on the use of formal logic as a representation language, both in Management Science and elsewhere (Kimbrough and Lee, 1988a; Kimbrough and Lee, 1988b; Kimbrough, 1990; Masuch, 1992; Bhargava and Kimbrough, 1994) . As a logic, FOL has considerable expressive power, and has useful features for developing better theories. For example, FOL provides precise criteria for theoretical consistency (is a theory contradiction-free?), soundness (are the explanations of a theory logically correct?) and contingency (is the theory falsi able?).
By testing a theory for these properties, the researcher can develop better theories with the help of logic. The researcher formulates his theory in a logical language, and the computer investigates the logical properties of this representation. The logical representation itself could then play the role of a simulation model, where the computation of the \outcome" is done through logical inferencing. Now, if one wants to spell out the logical consequences of a set of assumptions, then one is, technically speaking, working on the \deductive closure" of this set \under the rules of inference". In formal logic, the deductive closure of a theory is taken for granted|in fact, the formal de nition of a \theory" is a set of assumptions closed under the rules of inference (Tarski, 1956) . In reality, however, it is impossible to generate the complete deductive closure of a premise set, for the resulting set is in nite (since it contains all tautologies, i.e., expressions that are always true, and hence follow from any set). In consequence, the complete deductive closure of a premise set is neither realizable nor desirable|only partial deductive closures provide useful results.
In this paper, we present an algorithm that performs an e cient partial deductive closure for an important class of formulas. We call this class SPtSP, (\single property to single property"); it comprises conditional formulas that link one property of an object to another property of an object. Examples include: if the size of an organization increases, then its inertia increases; and if the inertia of an organization increases, then its survival chance increases. Statements of this form provide the backbone of any empirical social science; arguably, it is the most important class of empirical statements in the social sciences.
In section 2, we give an overview of the representation language, FOL. Section 3 discusses the role of formal logic in theory-building; in analogy to the cyclic research process in empirical research, we describe a logical cycle of theory development. Section 4 describes the algorithm. The next two sections (5 and 6) show the algorithm in action, working on the \inertia" fragment of an important organization theory, Organizational Ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . As it turns out, our algorithm generates more theorems than the original discursive theory of organizational inertia made explicit, some of which are of theoretical interest. The last section discusses some limits to our approach, regarding both the algorithm and the use of FOL as a representation language.
The research reported in this article is part of a larger e ort at the Center for Computer Science in Organization and Management (CCSOM) of the University of Amsterdam to develop a formal methodology of theory analysis and theory building. This e ort includes the application of standard logics to existing theories in organization and management (P eli et al., 1994; P eli and Masuch, 1994; Bruggeman, forthcoming) , the development of \non-standard" logics especially suited for the representation of action theories (Huang et al., 1996; Masuch and Huang, 1994; P olos and Masuch, 1995) , and the development of software that supports theory building using formal logic ( O Nuall ain, 1993) .
Formal Machinery: First Order Logic
The formal language used in this article is rst order logic (FOL; see P eli et al. (1994) appendix A, or standard textbooks, such as (Je rey, 1967; Gamut, 1991; Gabbay and Guenthner, 1989) ). Developing from Aristotle's treatment of syllogisms, FOL is usually identi ed with \classical" logic, or even with the logic by the general public. FOL is based on the idea that the world consists of objects (the \universe" of discourse) that have certain properties, or that stand in certain relations with each other. Objects are represented by symbols for constants and variables; properties and relations are referred to by predicate symbols. More speci cally, there are: Quanti ers; symbols that range over the domain, i.e., 8 \for all", and 9 \exists". Variables; name slots for objects, that allow the use of quanti ers (roughly comparable to pronouns in English, we use lower case symbols, e.g., p, q, x, x 1 , . . . ).
Predicate constants; names for properties of, or relations between, objects (we use capitalized strings of symbols, e.g., Size(o 1 ; s 1 ), or in x predicates, e.g., (s 1 > s 2 ) ).
Logical connectives; symbols that allow the building of complex expressions from simple expressions (the ve standard connectives are negation (: \not"), disjunction (_ \or"), conjunction (^\and"), conditional (! \if-then"), and biconditional ($ \if-and-onlyif") Mortal(Socrates) These premises do not justify the conclusion, since the existential statement about mortality does not exclude the possibility that some men are not mortal, and Socrates may be an instance of the immortal group.
From a logical point of view, a theoretical explanation coincides with derivability; the derivation \explains" the conclusion in logical terms (Salmon, 1989) . The notion derivability can be brought to bear upon the basic logical properties of a set of propositions; if the set is inconsistent, then it gives rise to contradictions, and hence to the derivation of the falsum (a formula that is always false). If the set is tautological (i.e., if the conjunction of its elements is always true) then its negation (i.e., the negation of the conjunction of its elements) gives rise to the falsum. If the set is contingent (falsi able in the terms of standard epistemology), then neither the set itself nor its negation can give rise to the falsum; that is to say, it is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.
Developing Theories with Logical Tools
Theories can be seen as propositional systems, and logic is traditionally used to order such systems. Logic provides the rationale for theoretical explanations; explanations, in turn, provide the justi cation for a theory. In this view, the \implications" of a theory are crucial for its justi cation: the better a theory, the better its \predictions" (note that predictions are just implications with a time-index). The formal de nition of a theory is a set of statements \closed" under the rules of inference (Tarski, 1956) , which would suggest that the logic itself does the job of providing the implications. In practice, however, the logical closure of a theory is not a given; some agent is needed to make logic happen, and to carry out the deductions. As a consequence, we need to distinguish between a premise set (an explicitly stated set of premises), a complete theory (the premise set closed under the rules of inference), and intermediate theories that represent the premise set plus some, but not necessarily all, of its logical consequences. In addition, we must recognize that theories are not always conceived as explicitly stated sets of formulas; they can also be perceived as some kind of knowledge of a theoretician regarding a domain, regardless how this knowledge is represented. For want of a better term, we call this kind of knowledge theoretical expectation. Obviously, theoretical expectations depend on their bearer and may change as the theory evolves (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) .
Formal inferencing and theoretical expectations interact. Conclusions that con rm earlier expectations strengthen con dence in the theory and unearth new ways to test it. Unexpected conclusions invite the theoretician to revise either his expectations or the original theory. If the theory does not make the right predictions, it must change, so nding out which conclusions are implied by a theory is an important part of theory building. Much like the cyclic research process in empirical research (problem identi cation; hypothesis formulation; research design; data collection; data analysis; hypothesis testing), there is a logical cycle in the interaction between theoretical expectations and formal inferencing.
The logical cycle can be described using the terminology introduced above (Figure 1 ). Theoretical expectations (TE) are formalized, yielding an intermediate theory (IT) . The intermediate theory may or may not be consistent. If it is inconsistent, either the formalization or the theoretical expectations require revisions. If it is consistent, continued theorizing yields a partial closure of the original IT. New conclusions (NC) can (1) con rm the theoretical expectations, (2) transcend the theoretical expectations, or (3) contradict the theoretical expectation. In the rst case, the partial closure can continue; in the second case, the theoretical expectations need to be updated; in the third case, either the formalization of the original expectations or the expectations themselves need to be revised. The cycle is never truly complete, since the deductive closure of any set is in nite. But not all conclusions that are technically derivable from a given set are of interest. For example, tautologies are derivable from any set of premises. But because they are always true, they tell us nothing about the domain|they are true regardless of the structure of the domain.
Although everybody agrees that theoretical labor is an important part of a researcher's work|thinking a theory through, taking it to its logical conclusions, ascertaining its consistency and coherence, and so on|the logical cycle has received very little attention in the literature. In the past, there was no method to guide the researcher more systematically through a maze of potential conclusions. With the advent of logical programming, however, we can now automate a partial deductive closure of a given set of assumptions.
Deduction of Theorems
We can get a partial deductive closure of a set of premises by applying inference rules to deduce new expressions (in technical terms \well-formed formulas", or \formulas" for short).
In this section, we describe an algorithm that performs a partial deductive closure of an important class of theorems. Our algorithm focuses on theorems that relate two properties of the domain. We call this class of statements \single property to single property" (SPtSP); it comprises conditional formulas that link one property of an object to another property of an object, as noted above. The algorithm is called PDC-1.
Informal Description of the Algorithm
The algorithm uses premises of the form SPtSP. An SPtSP expression relates one quanti able property to another, such as higher inertia yields to higher survival chances. Additionally, such an expression may have constraints that restrict it to certain types of objects, e.g., to reorganization-free organizations: reorganization-free organizations with higher inertia have higher survival chances. Assume that a domain is characterized by the following premises:
Constraints 1^P roperty 1 ! Property 2 Constraints 2^P roperty 2 ! Property 3 Constraints 3^P roperty 3 ! Property 4
A theorem that relates Property 1 with Property 4 can be deduced from these three premises by \cutting out" Property 2 and Property 3 :
Constraints 1^C onstraints 2^C onstraints 3^P roperty 1 ! Property 4
As cases in point, we take three premises from the domain of Organizational Ecology. The following notation is used to represent SPtSP class expressions: Constraints]^Property 1 ! Property 2 . The Property 1 and Property 2 are referring to two quanti able properties of the domain. The Constraints] are the restricting conjuncts (either one or more conjuncts). The square brackets \ : : :]" are used to di erentiate the conjuncts of the Constraints from Property 1 in the antecedent. These brackets are added only to improve readability, and are ignored by the formal machinery. Assume we have the following premises (assumption 5, 3b and 2a in section 5 respectively):
Larger organizations have higher inertia than smaller organizations of the same class: 8c; i 1 ; i 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Class(x; c; t 1 )^Class(y; c; t 2 )^Size(x; s 1 ; t 1 ) Size(y; s 2 ; t 2 )^Iner(x; i 1 ; t 1 )^Iner(y; i 2 ; t 2 )]^(s 2 > s 1 ) ! (i 2 > i 1 )) (read: For all c; i 1 ; i 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y if x and y are organizations of the same class c at time t 1 and t 2 , and s 1 and i 1 are, respectively, the size and inertia of x at t 1 and s 2 and i 2 are, respectively, the size and inertia of y at t 2 , and s 2 exceeds s 1 , then i 2 exceeds i 1 .)
Reorganization-free organizations with higher inertia have higher reproducibility: 8i 1 ; i 2 ; rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 )^Reorg free(y; t 2 ; t 2 )
Iner(x; i 1 ; t 1 )^Iner(y; i 2 ; t 2 )^Repr(x; rp 1 ; t 1 )^Repr(y; rp 2 ; t 2 )] (i 2 > i 1 ) ! (rp 2 > rp 1 )) (read: For all i 1 ; i 2 ; rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y if x and y are organizations not in reorganization at time t 1 and t 2 respectively, and i 1 and rp 1 are, respectively, the inertia and reproducibility of x at t 1 , and i 2 and rp 2 are, respectively, the inertia and reproducibility of y at t 2 , and i 2 exceeds i 1 then rp 2 exceeds rp 1 .)
Organizations with higher reproducibility have higher reliability/accountability: 8ra 1 ; ra 2 ; rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Repr(x; rp 1 ; t 1 )^Repr(y; rp 2 ; t 2 )
Relacc(x; ra 1 ; t 1 )^Relacc(y; ra 2 ; t 2 )]^(rp 2 > rp 1 ) ! (ra 2 > ra 1 )) (read: For all ra 1 ; ra 2 ; rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y if x and y are organizations at time t 1 and t 2 respectively, and rp 1 and ra 1 are, respectively, the reproducibility and reliability/accountability of x at t 1 , and rp 2 and ra 2 are, respectively, the reproducibility and reliability/accountability of y at t 2 , and rp 2 exceeds rp 1 then ra 2 exceeds ra 1 .) These premises are used to create a new theorem relating size and reliability/accountability, by following the same steps as in the abstract example. The set of constraints on this theorem is the superset of the constraints on the individual premises. Identical conjuncts in this set can be removed (since (p^p) $ p). This leads to the following new theorem:
Larger reorganization-free organizations have higher reliability/accountability than smaller organizations of the same class: 8c; ra 1 ; ra 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 )^Reorg free(y; t 2 ; t 2 )
Class(x; c; t 1 )^Class(y; c; t 2 )^Size(x; s 1 ; t 1 )^Size(y; s 2 ; t 2 )^Relacc(x; ra 1 ; t 1 ) Relacc(y; ra 2 ; t 2 )]^(s 2 > s 1 ) ! (ra 2 > ra 1 )) (read: For all c; ra 1 ; ra 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y if x and y are organizations of the same class c and not in reorganizational period at time points t 1 and t 2 respectively, and s 1 and ra 1 are, respectively, the size and reliability/accountability of x at t 1 , and s 2 and ra 2 are, respectively, the size and reliability/accountability of y at t 2 , and s 2 exceeds s 1 then ra 2 exceeds ra 1 .)
Formal Speci cation
The partial deductive closure of a premise set is generated in three steps:
Filter premises The premises of the domain are ltered for SPtSP premises. Only these premises are used to construct new theorems.
Deduce new theorems The construction of new theorems. The algorithm uses the SPtSP premises to derive new SPtSP theorems.
Filter new theorems The set of constructed theorems is re ned by removing: 1) vacuously true theorems, 2) weaker versions of other theorems in the set, and 3) super uous conjuncts. Table 3 introduces the notation we use to refer to the premise set and the derived theorems:
Symbol Description the original premise set used as a starting point for the algorithm Step 1 The algorithm constructs new theorems for each pair fProp a ; Prop b g of properties in . Pairs of the same properties fProp a ; Prop a g are excluded, since they would yield tautologies like organizations with higher inertia have higher inertia.
Step 2 Step 3 To avoid cycles in this re nement process, the algorithm only considers premises that introduce a new property. For example, if an initial formula relating inertia and reproducibility is found in step 2, then a premise relating reproducibility and inertia is not applied in step 3, since the property inertia was used before. This prevents the construction of some tautologies (like organizations with higher inertia have higher inertia).
If the formula i cannot be further re ned (there is no (further) premise that relates Prop i and Prop i+1 ), the algorithm has reached a dead-end. The algorithm retracts the last re nement i and attempts to construct other re nements of i?1 (the previous version of i ).
Step 4 The re nement of formula i is completed if a theorem is constructed that relates Prop a and Prop b (in other words Prop i+1 in step 3 is the desired Prop b ). The new theorem i+1 is added to 0 , the set of deduced SPtSP theorems. Since there may be more than one theorem that relates Prop a and Prop b , the algorithm retracts i+1 after a successful theorem construction in step 4 in order to nd formulas constructed using di erent combinations of premises. This allows for the construction of theorems relating to di erent contexts, like the survival chance of reorganizing organizations decreases with time and the survival chance of reorganization-free organizations increases with time.
If Prop i+1 in step 3 is not the desired Prop b , step 3 is repeated.
PDC-1 uses a standard algorithm for variable uni cation (Robinson, 1965) in step 3. This variable uni cation is necessary to determine that a formula, such as 8o 1 ; t a (O(o 1 ; t a ) ), can be made equal to another formula, such as 8x; y(O(x; y)), because the variables can be uni ed, in this case x with o 1 and y with t a .
Filter Theorems
We have three lters to re ne the set of constructed theorems. The rst lter removes vacuously true theorems, the second removes weaker or identical versions of theorems, and the last lter removes super uous conjuncts in theorems. The lters create a more concise set of theorems by removing non-interesting theorems. Removing these theorems does not a ect the theory, because more interesting theorems (including those that imply the removed ones) remain in the theorem set.
Vacuously An organization cannot be reorganization-free and reorganizing at the same time:
8x; t 1 ; t 2 (:(Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^Reorg(x; t 1 ; t 2 ))) Assume that we have constructed a theorem with the following constraints:
For all reorganization-free organizations under reorganization . . . 8x; t 1 ; t 2 ; : : :( O(x; t 1 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^Reorg(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^: : :]^: : : ! : : :) In this case, the antecedent of the theorem is inconsistent with the premise set, and the theorem is true regardless of the consequent (which may be even the falsum).
In sum, if we can substitute the falsum for the consequent in a theorem, and this theorem still holds, then the theorem is vacuously true. Such a theorem only holds because of the (hidden) contradiction in its antecedent. Vacuously true theorems do not provide any theoretical insights, therefore, their removal does not a ect the theory.
Filter out weaker versions of a theorem Di erent premises can lead to di erent theorems that relate the same pair of properties. Sometimes these theorems are complementary: for example, one theorem is restricted to reorganizations, and another to reorganization-free periods, like the survival chance of reorganizing organizations decreases with time and the survival chance of reorganization-free organizations increases with time. But in other cases, one of them may subsume the other: for example, if one theorem states that the inertia of organization x is larger than the inertia of organization y and another theorem that the inertia of organization x is larger or equal than the inertia of organization y, the latter theorem is weaker. In this case weaker versions of the same theorem are removed. The lter evaluates for every theorem whether it is the unique or strongest version of the formula. Identical theorems and theorems with weaker antecedents or stronger consequents are removed. Identical or weaker versions of a theorem are uninteresting because they can be derived from a stronger version. Relacc(x; ra 1 ; t 1 )^Relacc(y; ra 2 ; t 2 )]^(s 2 > s 1 ) ! (ra 2 > ra 1 ))
The inertia and reproducibility conjuncts must exist for the conditions of the premises to be ful lled. If their existence is postulated (as is the case in the formal inertia theory), these conjuncts can be removed from the constraints.
For every organization, there is some inertia that it has: 8x; t(O(x; t) ! 9i(Iner(x; i; t)))
For every organization, there is some reproducibility that it has: 8x; t(O(x; t) ! 9rp(Repr(x; rp; t)))
The inertia and reproducibility conjuncts can now be derived from the organization conjuncts. The set of constraints is simpli ed (this was tacitly done in section 4.1):
8c; ra 1 ; ra 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 ) Reorg free(y; t 2 ; t 2 )^Class(x; c; t 1 )^Class(y; c; t 2 )^Size(x; s 1 ; t 1 )^Size(y; s 2 ; t 2 ) Relacc(x; ra 1 ; t 1 )^Relacc(y; ra 2 ; t 2 )]^(s 2 > s 1 ) ! (ra 2 > ra 1 ))
This concludes the description of our algorithm for the partial closure of SPtSP formulas. In the next two sections, we show the algorithm in action; it is applied to a fragment of an important organization theory, the \inertia" part of Organizational Ecology (OE). We rst give a brief account of OE, then provide a formalization of the inertia part of OE, and nally show how the algorithm performs the partial deductive closure of this part.
Inertia Fragment of Organizational Ecology
Most organizational theories regard organizations as agents that adapt rationally to changing environments (Thompson, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979) . OE, in contrast, sees organizational structures evolving through environmental selection. When environmental conditions change, new organizations emerge, and maladapted organizations die.
Organizational ecology employs analogies from biology. Genes determine the action repertoire of organisms, whereas organizations' repertoires are xed by their core features. Organizations of the same form make up a population (just as organisms of the same form make up a species). Several factors inhibit the exibility and adaptation of organizations, such as sunk costs, political coalitions, or the hazards of lost legitimacy.
Organizational ecology considers changes in the environment to be largely unpredictable. Organizations are characterized by structural inertia|if they adapt, they do so slowly. Contrary to the rational adaptation approach, however, successful organizations are inert, not exible. Organizations must produce their products or services reliably and account for their actions rationally. To do so, they must be able to reproduce their structures smoothly. But the factors that facilitate their reproducibility make organizations resistant to change. Thus, inertia is a byproduct of reproducibility.
Organizational ecology does recognize the possibility of rational adaptation. To adapt, organizations must reorganize. Organizations can change their structures to a certain degree, but reorganizations typically involve changes in core features. Such changes are dangerous; they involve large resources, and organizational learning must start anew and higher up on the learning curve. Even if an organization survives a major reorganization, its environment may change in unexpected ways and the reorganization might be in vain. So if organizations attempt to adapt, they are not likely to succeed. Inert organizations|those that resist the temptation to reorganize|may be less at risk than exible organizations.
Symbol Description
Class(x; c; t) object x is a member of class c at time t Compl(x; cp; t) object x is characterized by complexity cp at time t Iner(x; i; t) object x has a value of inertia i at time t O(x; t) object x is an organization at time t Relacc(x; ra; t) object x has a value of reliability/accountability ra at time t Reorg(x; t 1 ; t 2 ) object x reorganizes between times t 1 and t 2 Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 2 ) object x has a reorganization-free period between times t 1 and t 2 Reorg type(x; rt; t) object x is in a reorganization of type rt at time t Repr(x; rp; t) object x has a value of reproducibility rp at time t Sc(x; p; t) the chance of survival of object x is p at time t Size(x; s; t) object x has a size s at time t Time(t) object t is a time-point x > y value x is larger than value y Table 4 : The meaning of the relation symbols.
The inertia part of OE is originally described in (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . A formalization of this theory in FOL has been published in (P eli et al., 1994) . We use the formulas representing the premises of P eli et al. (1994) as input, and let our algorithm derive the theorems. The premises will be discussed in this section, and the derivable theorems in section 6. Table 4 characterizes the relation symbols that are used in the formulas of the inertia fragment.
As noted above, OE stipulates that inertia|not exibility|helps organizations to survive (Theorem 1), the reason being that inertia is associated with reliability and other features that help organizations to survive. Assumptions 1{3 are put forward to justify Theorem 1 (the original justi cation in (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) is not sound, but one can derive the theorem by strengthening the assumptions, as shown in (P eli et al., 1994) Repr(x; rp 1 ; t 1 )^Repr(y; rp 2 ; t 2 )^Iner(x; i 1 ; t 1 )^Iner(y; i 2 ; t 2 )]^(i 2 > i 1 ) ! (rp 2 > rp 1 )) The next two theorems spell out the consequences of environmental selection through time: (surviving) organizations will tend to become increasingly inert (Theorem 2), and so their survival chances increase (Theorem 3). Justifying these theorems requires the assumption that \reproducibility of structure increases monotonically with age" (Assumption 4). Assumption 4 The reproducibility of reorganization-free organizations increases with time: 8rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x( Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^O(x; t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^Repr(x; rp 1 ; t 1 )
Repr(x; rp 2 ; t 2 )]^(t 2 > t 1 ) ! (rp 2 > rp 1 )) Under the heading of \reorganization", Theorem 4 covers organizational change: organizations may attempt structural change, but such change puts the organization more at risk than inertia. Hannan and Freeman (1984) claim that Theorem 4 relies on the assumptions that reorganization lowers the reliability of organizational performance (Assumption 6), and that the structural inertia of an organization increases with size (for organizations belonging to the same class; Assumption 5). Assumption 5 Larger organizations of the same class have higher inertia: 8c; i 1 ; i 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Class(x; c; t 1 )^Class(y; c; t 2 )^Size(x; s 1 ; t 1 ) Size(y; s 2 ; t 2 )^Iner(x; i 1 ; t 1 )^Iner(y; i 2 ; t 2 )]^(s 2 > s 1 ) ! (i 2 > i 1 )) Assumption 6 The reliability and accountability of reorganizing organizations decreases with time: 8ra 1 ; ra 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x( Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^O(x; t 2 )^Reorg(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^Relacc(x; ra 1 ; t 1 ) Relacc(x; ra 2 ; t 2 )]^(t 2 > t 1 ) ! (ra 1 > ra 2 )) The last and fth theorem of the inertia fragment states that \complexity increases the risk of death due to reorganization". To simplify the setup, the fth theorem is added as a premise (Assumption 7); this gives a total of seven assumptions. 1 Assumption 7 (Theorem 5) More complex organizations of the same class have lower survival chances after reorganizations of the same type: 8c; c 1 ; c 2 ; p; p 1 ; p 2 ; re; t a ; t b ; t c ; x; y( O(x; t a )^O(y; t a )^O(x; t c )^O(y; t c )^Class(x; c; t a ) Class(y; c; t a )^Sc(x; p; t a )^Sc(y; p; t a )^Reorg(x; t a ; t b )^Reorg(y; t a ; t c )^Reorg type(x; re; t a ) Reorg type(y; re; t a )^Reorg free(x; t b ; t c )^Sc(x; p 1 ; t c )^Sc(y; p 2 ; t c )^Compl(x; c 1 ; t a ) Compl(y; c 2 ; t a )]^(c 2 > c 1 ) ! (p 1 > p 2 )) In addition, the premise set contains twelve premises that formulate the necessary background knowledge, e.g., organizations are either reorganizing or not reorganizing. These premises are implicitly used in in the original text (Meaning Postulates 1{12). Meaning Postulate 1 Reorganization-free from t 1 to t 2 means reorganization-free at t 1 and at t 2 :
Meaning Postulate 9 For every organization, there is some reproducibility that it has: 8x; t(O(x; t) ! 9rp(Repr(x; rp; t))) Meaning Postulate 10 For every organization, there is some survival chance that it has: 8x; t(O(x; t) ! 9p(Sc(x; p; t))) Meaning Postulate 11 For every organization, there is some inertia that it has: 8x; t(O(x; t) ! 9i(Iner(x; i; t))) Meaning Postulate 12 For every organization, there is some class to which it belongs: 8x; t(O(x; t) ! 9c(Class(x; c; t))) 6 Application of PDC-1 to the Inertia Fragment This section exempli es the results of the PDC-1 when applied to the inertia part of OE. Starting with the seven assumptions and twelve background assumptions listed in section 5, PDC-1 generates a total of seventeen theorems|twelve more than are presented in the original text. Several of the new theorems are theoretically important. The rst ve theorems coincide with the theorems of the original text; their theoretical importance has been justi ed in (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . Theorem 1 Reorganization-free organizations with higher inertia have higher survival chances: 8i 1 ; i 2 ; p 1 ; p 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 )^Reorg free(y; t 2 ; t 2 )^Iner(x; i 1 ; t 1 )^Iner(y; i 2 ; t 2 )
O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Sc(x; p 1 ; t 1 )^Sc(y; p 2 ; t 2 )]^(i 2 > i 1 ) ! (p 2 > p 1 ))
Theorem 2 The inertia of reorganization-free organizations increases with time: 8i 1 ; i 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x( Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^O(x; t 2 ) Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 )^Reorg free(x; t 2 ; t 2 )^Iner(x; i 1 ; t 1 )^Iner(x; i 2 ; t 2 )] (t 2 > t 1 ) ! (i 2 > i 1 ))
Theorem 3 The survival chance of reorganization-free organizations increases with time: 8p 1 ; p 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; y( Sc(y; p 1 ; t 1 )^Sc(y; p 2 ; t 2 )^Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^O(y; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 ) Reorg free(y; t 1 ; t 2 )]^(t 2 > t 1 ) ! (p 2 > p 1 )) Compl(y; c 2 ; t a )]^(c 2 > c 1 ) ! (p 1 > p 2 )) Theorems 6 and 7 are straightforward extensions of Assumptions 4 and 6. Theorem 6 The reliability and accountability of reorganization-free organizations increases with time: 8ra 1 ; ra 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; y( Relacc(y; ra 1 ; t 1 )^Relacc(y; ra 2 ; t 2 )^Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^O(y; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 ) Reorg free(y; t 1 ; t 2 )]^(t 2 > t 1 ) ! (ra 2 > ra 1 ))
Theorem 7 The reproducibility of reorganizing organizations decreases with time: 8rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x( Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^Reorg(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^O(x; t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^Repr(x; rp 1 ; t 2 ) Repr(x; rp 2 ; t 1 )]^(t 2 > t 1 ) ! (rp 2 > rp 1 )) The rst important new theorem, Theorem 8, says that organizational size has a positive impact on survival chance. It hinges on Assumption 5, and con rms the theoretical expectation regarding the context of environmental selection. It helps build con dence in the premise set as an adequate representation of OE. Theorem 8 Larger reorganization-free organizations of the same class have higher survival chances: Theorem 10 Larger reorganization-free organizations of the same class have higher reliability and accountability:
8c; ra 1 ; ra 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( Class(x; c; t 1 )^Class(y; c; t 2 )^Size(x; s 1 ; t 1 )^Size(y; s 2 ; t 2 ) Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 )^Reorg free(y; t 2 ; t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Relacc(x; ra 1 ; t 1 ) Relacc(y; ra 2 ; t 2 )]^(s 2 > s 1 ) ! (ra 2 > ra 1 )) Theorem 11, however, is unexpected: the normal expectation is that organizations can decrease in size without reorganizing. Theorem 11 points either to a weakness in the premise set as the formal representation of OE, or to a limitation of OE itself. On closer inspection, the premise set appears to provide an adequate representation of the theory's assumptions (fortunately, the original text (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) gives an explicit list of both assumptions and theorems). So we may conclude that Theorem 11 points to a limitation of OE. OE appears less general than expected, or, to put it more formally, its apparent class of models is smaller than expected. In fact, OE appears to imply a dichotomy between (1) organizations under \normal" conditions and (2) organizations under reorganization. OE's theoretical setup dictates that any decrease in size requires reorganization, so Theorem 11 gives a di erent meaning to the term \reorganization", or, rather points out how general the meaning of this term is in the theory of OE. Theorem 11 The size of reorganization-free organizations of the same class does not decrease with time:
8c; s 1 ; s 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x( Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 2 )^Reorg free(x; t 2 ; t 2 ) Reorg free(x; t 1 ; t 1 )^O(x; t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^Class(x; c; t 2 )^Class(x; c; t 1 )^Size(x; s 2 ; t 2 ) Size(x; s 1 ; t 1 )]^(t 2 > t 1 ) ! :(s 1 > s 2 )) Theorems 12 through 13 are expected, but they, too, show in subtle ways the limits of OE by demonstrating the equivalence of inertia, reliability, and reproducibility. This equivalence is not intended by the original text, but is is required to establish the soundness of Theorem 1 (as argued in (P eli et al., 1994) ). By implication, Theorems 12{13 reiterate a problem in the explanatory structure of the original theory.
Theorem 12 Organizations with higher reproducibility have higher survival chance: 8p 1 ; p 2 ; rp 1 ; rp 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; x; y( Repr(x; rp 1 ; t 1 )^Repr(y; rp 2 ; t 2 )^O(x; t 1 )^O(y; t 2 )^Sc(x; p 1 ; t 1 ) Sc(y; p 2 ; t 2 )]^(rp 2 > rp 1 ) ! (p 2 > p 1 )) Theorem 13a Reorganization-free organizations with higher inertia have higher reliability and ac- The next three theorems, Theorems 14{16, strengthen the original theoretical expectations, but the last, Theorem 17, is also unexpected, and forces an update of the theoretical expectations. The premises of the inertia fragment and the theorems derived by PDC-1 are shown in Figure 2 . The nodes represent the theorems (a theorem relates the top-node with the node); the arrows denote the premises that constitute the theorems.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have argued that formal logic helps researchers to improve a theory in various ways. In a static perspective, logic can help them to answer questions of consistency and explanatory soundness. In a dynamic perspective, logic can help to discover hidden implications of a given theory, or, more precisely, implications of a formal representation of the theory in logical terms. As the logical cycle demonstrates, the partial closure can advance a theory in various ways, either by reinforcing original theoretical expectations about a domain, or by suggesting a modi cation of those expectations. Conversely, if there is no reason to modify the expectations, the partial closure can point out weaknesses in the formal representation of the theory.
PDC-1 has its limits, of course. First, the algorithm works only on a fragment of FOL, namely on formulas that we called \single property to single property". This fragment is arguably important|important enough to allow for a formalization of the inertia part of OE|but it does not have the full expressive power of FOL.
Second, FOL itself has its limits. There has been a lively debate in philosophy about the use of FOL as a tool for formalizing scienti c theories (Ayer, 1959) . Many scienti c theories involve notions that FOL cannot handle directly, such as counterfactual conditions and intensional constructs. One could even argue that scienti c laws are not material implications as provided by FOL. Because of this, there is a broad agreement that FOL on its own is too weak to formalize all scienti c theories. However, our goals are more modest; we focus on theories that do not transcend the expressive boundaries of FOL. Even if scienti c laws are not material implications they do imply material implications (as was kindly pointed out to us by one reviewer), and it remains of interest to generate implicit consequences thereof. Organizational ecology, the domain theory examined in this article, is restricted to objectrelated statements about properties and relations. But action theories, an important class of theories in the social sciences, do involve opaque contexts that are created by actions; for such theories, modal action logics appear more appropriate. Evidence on the formalization of J.D. Thompson's Organization in Action (Masuch and Huang, 1994) shows, for example, that extending FOL with modal (intensional) operators facilitates the formal representation of an action theory considerably.
Third, FOL is not necessarily the most elegant or e cient language. Once a representation in FOL has been generated for a speci c domain, simpler, or more parsimonious representations may suggest themselves (Newell and Simon, 1972; Brachman and Levesque, 1985) . But the general experience in natural language representation points to a trade o between speci city and exibility. For speci c domains, specialized languages may appear more appropriate, but such languages are not easily generalizable to other domains. Conversely, a general language may not give the most e cient representation for a particular domain, but it carries over more easily to other domains; because of this, a general language is more appropriate for a generic application for theorem-nding. Using FOL has one additional, very important advantage: its formal properties are well-understood. The formal properties of specialized ad hoc languages are, as a rule, not known. For example, without a formal semantics, one has no criteria for soundness; without a proof theory, one has no machinery for derivations.
Fourth, PDC-1 is restricted to nding the logical implications of a given set of premises. It cannot generate new conclusions in a logical sense. In fact, once the logic plus a set of premises are xed, no deductive procedure can generate logically new conclusions; logically new conclusions require new premises or a new logic. The motivation for this research was to generate theorems that are \new" in an empirical sense: implied by the logic but (perhaps) unknown to the researcher. Such conclusions may or may not be of particular interest|in this sense the choice to focus on SPtSP formulas is of a heuristic nature. There is no guarantee that PDC-1 (or more general algorithms, for that matter) will always generate interesting (empirically) new theorems. In our case study the algorithm does generate interesting theorems, but more cases are needed to settle this empirical matter.
The usefulness of PDC-1 was demonstrated for an important organization theory, Organizational Ecology; the algorithm generated a set of new theorems, including some of real theoretical importance, notably theorem 11. The fact that the theory implies that organizations cannot decrease in size under normal conditions is clearly important for gauging the OE's scope and setup. Of course, the algorithm's job could also have been done \by hand". In fact, some of the new theorems had already been detected by hand, as reported in (P eli et al., 1994) ; but then, some had not.
Our tool can also be used during the original formalization of the theory. Recall that the algorithm also identi ed all previously known theorems from the premises, so it could have been used to check the soundness of the original theory. In fact, the investigation of the inertia fragment by our method would have revealed several more or less serious aws in the explanatory structure of the original presentation of the theory. In particular, it would have pointed out that the derivation of Theorem 1 (selection favors inertia), arguably the most important theorem of the inertia part, is unsound, and that a sound derivation requires additional quali cations that reduce the scope of the original theory quite considerably, see (P eli et al., 1994) . Furthermore, the algorithm can help to enlarge the scope of the theory by helping the theoretician to nd out \what would happen if" he would add new assumptions to the original premise set. In this way, PDC-1 makes an important step towards an application for logical simulation.
As a direct follow-up of the reported research, we want to extend the PDC-1 algorithm to other classes of theorems. Taking into account that a complete deductive closure will comprise in nitely many theorems (most of them completely uninteresting), extending the PDC-1 algorithm should be done with care. The job of the algorithm is not only to derive a particular class of theorems, but also to ensure that nothing else is derived.
